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EXCISE TAXES AND THE UNIFORMITY CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENTUCKY
E. G. TRIMBI M*
The pending litigation involving the ice cream tax and
other features of the omnibus tax law emphasizes the difficulties
into which the legislature is likely to run in levying excise taxes
because of the restrictive features of the state constitution. Some
of these difficulties may be avoided by a study of the decisions
of the Court of Appeals in which it has defined the term
"excise", explained the scope of legislative authority, and inter-
preted the clauses of the constitution which have the greatest
bearing on the constitutionality of such taxes.
The sections of the constitution most concerned are Sections
171 and 181. Section 171 reads in part as follows:
"Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only and
shall be uniform upon all property of the same class subject to taxa-
tion within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax; and
all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws."
Section 181 reads:
"The general assembly may, by general laws only, provide for the
payment of license fees on franchises, stock used for breeding pur-
poses, the various trades, occupations and professions, or a special
or excise tax; and may by laws delegate the power to counties, towns,
cities, and other municipal corporations, to impose and collect license
fees on stock sold for breeding purposes, on franchises, trades, occupa-
tions and professions."
It will be observed that the uniformity clause occurs in
Section 171 and obviously was intended to apply to property
taxes, as the Court of Appeals said in an early1 case. That the
clause applies to the great body of excise taxes also is not so
clear.
The term "excise" has a rather broad meaning today. The
*.A. B., Berea 1922; Ph. D., Yale 1927; Asst. Prof. of Political
Science, Univ. of Ky.
IStrater Bros. Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 604, 78
S. W. 871 (1904).
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Court of Appeals, in one case,2 quoted Ruling Case Law defining
it thus:
"Excises, in their original sense, were something cut off from the
price paid on a sale of goods, as a contribution to the support of the
government. The word has come to have a broader meaning and in-
cludes every form of taxation which is not a burden laid directly
upon persons or property; in other words, excises include every form
of charge imposed upon the performance of an act, the enjoyment of a
privilege, or the engaging in an occupation."
Judge T. H. Cooley defines it as a tax levied "on the manufac-
ture, sale, or consumption of commodities within the country, on
licenses to pursue certain occupations, and on corporate
privileges. "3
The use made of the term in Section 181 of the constitu-
tion would seem to indicate that it meant to the framers of that
document something different from the various license taxes on
trades, occupations, professions, and franchises, for, after men-
tioning these, the phrase "or special or excise tax" occurs. The
Court of Appeals has indicated that there is a difference between
pure excises, and license and occupation taxes. 4 But from the
standpoint of the rules of law laid down in applying the uni-
formity clause it is not important whether the term is used in
the narrow or broad sense. Nor is it necessary to attempt to
classify the various license taxes coming under the term in its
broad sense into trade, occupation, and profession taxes. The
same legal principles apply and most of these types of taxes are
license taxes levied for revenue and regulatory purposes, and are
variously classed as occupation, trade, or franchise taxes.
The present constitution containing the uniformity clause
was adopted in 1891, but it was not until 1908 in the case of
Hager v. Walkers that the court gave consideration to the ques-
tion of whether the uniformity clause applied to excise taxes.
It had, before that time, applied the clause in passing upon
license taxes,6 but without writing elaborate or full opinions.
In fact, the principle that taxes must be uniform seems always
2State Tax Commission v. Hughes, 219 Ky. 432, 293 S. W. 944,
945 (1927).
3Constitutional Limitations, 7 ed. (1903), p. 680.
' Shanks v. Ky. Independent Oil Co., 225 Ky. 303, 8 S. W. (2d) 383
(1928).
5 128 Ky. 1, 107 S. W. 254 (1918).
6 Strater Bros. Tob. Co. v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 604, 78 S. W.
871 (1904).
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to have been applied by Kentucky courts even though the pre-
vious constitutions had no provision on the matter.
7
The case of Hager v. Walker involved the constitutionality
of a state law of 1906 imposing a license tax of twenty-five dol-
lars on real estate agents doing business in cities of the first,
second, and third classes and ten dollars on those doing business
in cities of the fourth, fifth, and sixth classes. The law was
challenged on the ground that it was not uniform because of the
classification according to cities and also because agents in the
rural sections were not taxed at all.
At the outset the court said it did not agree with counsel
for the appellee that the uniformity clause "applies directly or
specifically to the license fees that may be levied on franchises
. . . trades, occupations, and professions mentioned in Sec-
tion 181". Yet the contention was entitled to serious considera-
tion as "indicating a purpose that all laws imposing taxes shall
operate in a uniform manner".
The court then pointed out that the legislature could
authorize the cities of the various classes to classify the trades,
occupations, and professions, and tax them separately. Cities
of the different classes did not have to tax the same trade at the
same rate. Nor did a particular city have to tax different trades
at the same rate. "But the license fees imposed upon any par-
ticular trade, occupation or profession in any class of cities"
said the court, "must be uniform in the sense that the same fee
must be charged every person engaged in the particular trade,
occupation or profession that is taxed." 9  The legislature itself
had the power, by general law, it continued, "to divide trades,
occupations, and professions into classes, and to impose a differ-
ent license fee upon each class that the trade, occupation, or pro-
fession may fairly and reasonably be divided into. To illustrate:
Dealers in hardware might be divided into wholesale and retail
dealers "1
Returning then to the law under consideration the court
took up the question whether the tax must be uniform on all in
'City of Lexington v. McQuillan, 9 Dana 513 (1839); Bullitt v.
City of Paducah, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 810, 3 S. W. 802 (1887); Rankin v. City
of Henderson, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 861, 7 S. W. 174 (1888); Simrall v. City of
Covington, 90 Ky. 444, 14 S. W. 369 (1890).
8128 Ky. 1, 8, 107 S. W. 254 (1918).
'Id. at 10.10 Id. at 11.
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the class in the sense that all had to pay the same tax regard-
less of the size of the city. "We do not believe it was contem-
plated by this section", the court continued, "that the General
Assembly might impose a license fee for state purposes upon
blacksmiths in one county and exempt blacksmiths in another."
If some in an occupation or profession were taxed and others
exempted the legislation "would not be general, but special or
local, and forbidden by Sections 59 and 60 of the constitution".
Such a construction the court thought was in "harmony -with
the dominant spirit of the constitution, which provides for uni-
formity in almost every subject it treats of . . ,,.11
Another weighty reason, in the opinion of the court, in
favor of uniformity "is the further consideration that it is im-
portant that the representatives of the people in the law-making
department of the government shall all be directly interested in
behalf of their constituents in laws involving the subject of taxa-
tion". 12 Some of course might not be properly interested if the
members of the class taxed who lived in their districts -were
exempted, as might occur if a law did not have to apply alike to
all in the occupation or profession.
The court went on to consider the history in the state of the
principle of uniformity and stated that it was a rule "that is
firmly embodied in the principles of constitutional law that have
always obtained in this state ... that although the legislature
may single out certain persons, trades, occupations, and pro-
fessions, dealing with each class separately, yet the burdens upon
every person in the class thus selected must be the same". 1 3
Since the legislature could classify, if there was a reason-
able basis for the classification, the question was whether the
law under consideration imposed a reasonable classification
based, as it was, on the size of the cities. This was not, in the
opinion of the court, a valid basis. Cities were classified solely
for the purpose of dealing with their local affairs and such
classification was not designed to influence or control legislation
for state purposes. A law that "arbitrarily singles out for
taxation a certain class of persons and exempts some of them
altogether is unfair and unequal".14 As a revenue measure
"Id. at 12.
"In. at 13.
"Id. at 17.
'Id. at 20
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therefore the law was unconstitutional. What it had said, the
court emphasized, had no application to a case involving an
exercise of the police power.
The question, therefore, of what the court will regard as a
reasonable classification is important. Almost every tax law
involves some classification and if it strikes the court as unrea-
sonable the law will generally be considered as lacking in uni-
formity. A review of the cases will disclose the principles and
reasoning followed by the Court of Appeals.
The cases reveal that three principles of classification have
been accepted by the court in upholding excise taxes. The first,
evidenced by the opinion in the above case, is that a uniform
tax upon all persons engaged in the same business -without
regard to the volume of business done is valid.
A city ordinance imposing a license tax on vehicles using
the streets graduated according to the number of horses used in
the vehicles was upheld as being uniform in the sense that every
two-horse vehicle would pay the same tax. 15 On the other hand,
a business tax, similar in principle, imposing a license fee of two
hundred dollars on four-horse wagons which was three times as
much as the tax on three-horse wagons was declared invalid be-
cause discriminatory. 16 "The taxing power may subdivide this
class", said the court, "but it cannot unjustly discriminate be-
tween the subdivisions so made. '1 Here the court did not
mention the uniformity clause by name, but the reasoning is the
same as that used when the uniformity clause is invoked. A tax
law which is not uniform is usually pronounced discriminatory.
An ordinance of Covington imposing a license tax on only
those grocers using delivery wagons was lacking in uniformity,
because grocers who used no wagons were exempted. 18 Also, a
license tax which is heavier on cash and carry grocery stores than
upon regular service grocery stores where both sell commodities
of approximately the same kind, character, quality, quantity,
"Smith v. City of Louisville, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 779, 6. S. W. 911
(1888).
16 Fiscal Court of Owen County v. F. and A. Cox Co., 32 Ky. L. Rep.
740 (1888).
11 Id. at 746.
"8 City of Covington v. Dalheim, 126 Ky. 26, 102 S. W. 829 (1907).
To same effect in regard to milk dealers, see Read v. Graham, 31 Ky.
L. Rep. 569, 102 S. W. 860 (1907). Also see, Weyman v. City of New-
port, 153 Ky. 487, 156 S. W. 109 (1913).
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and for approximately the same price is discriminatory and
invalid.19 In neither case was there a valid basis of distinction.
But a license tax upon all vendors of milk except those who sell
from regular groceries is not lacking in uniformity where the
latter pay a license tax on their general business. 20  In Common-
wealth v. Payne Medical C0.21 a statute singled out sellers of
patent medicines exclusively and imposed on them a license tax
of one hundred dollars annually. The law was challenged as
not being uniform since druggists selling such medicines along
with other articles were exempt. The court held the law lack-
ing in uniformity. Such a tax "must be uniform in the sense
that the same fee must be charged every person engaged, under
substantially similar conditions and circumstances, in the par-
ticular trade . . . taxed". 22
An ordinance imposing a license tax on painting contractors,
but exempting the individuals working for themselves and who
had no employee is valid.2 3  Also, insurance companies could be
classified into those writing industrial and those writing ordi-
nary life insurance, the former being taxed one hundred dollars
annually and the latter twenty-five dollars.24 Here the classifi-
cation had a reasonable basis. The same was true in Williams
v. Bowling Green,'2 5 where a license tax of two hundred dollars
was imposed on persons engaged in soliciting business of clean-
ing and dyeing clothes when the clothes were to be sent to Nash-
ville, but taxing those in the same business who had a plant
within the city only twenty-five dollars. The two businesses
were essentially different, the court felt.
A city cannot, however, tax agents of insurance companies
not located in the city and exempt agents of local companies.
Since the business of the two classes is the same such a law is
held to be discriminatory, and partial.26
11City of Danville v. Quaker Maid, 211 Ky. 677, 278 S. W. 98
(1926).
0 City of Newport v. French Bros. Bauer Co., 169 Ky. 174, 183
S. W. 532 (1916).
138 Ky. 164, 127 S. W. 760 (1910).
'AId. at 170.
2 Young v. City of Lexington, 235 Ky. 822, 32 S. W. (2d) 410
(1930).
21 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. City of Paris, 138 Ky. 801,
129 S. W. 112 (1910).
M254 Ky. 11, 70 S. W. (2d) 967 (1934).
Simrall v. Covington, 90 Ky. 444, 14 S. W. 369 (1890).
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In Commonwealth v. Hazel2 7 a statute placed a license tax
on tax brokers, that is, persons who made a business of buying
lands being sold for taxes. Only those who bought land for as
much as five hundred dollars had to pay the tax. The law was
challenged as being based on an unreasonable classification
according to the reasoning in Covington v. Dalheim referred to
above. The court held however that the legislature in making
the law apply only to those who bought land for as much as five
hundred dollars was laying down a test by which to distinguish
the regular tax broker from the occasional buyer. This it could
do since the line had to be drawn somewhere.
In the cases discussed above the Court of Appeals examined
the law to see if there was a reasonable basis for the classification
imposed and to see if the tax imposed applied uniformly to all
those of the class concerned. If either condition was met, the
other one usually was also and the law was upheld. Just what
the court's test of "reasonable" was is not always revealed. For
instance, it could well be argued that in Covington v. Dalheim
above there was a reasonable basis for distinction between
grocers who used no delivery trucks and those who did, since the
latter were using the city streets in ways that the former were
not. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Payne Medical Co. above a
reasonable distinction could conceivably be made between sellers
of patent medicines exclusively and the ordinary druggist. Per-
haps the controlling elements in the court's decisions are to be
found in the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the
laws.
In addition to the license taxes imposed on the businesses
and occupations discussed, and, involving the same principle,
are license taxes imposed on the professions. A particular pro-
fession may be singled out and taxed so long as the tax is uni-
form on the entire class. Since a particular profession is not so
easily divided into sub-classes there has been less difficulty in
applying this type of license tax.
In Bu litt v. City of Paducah28 the court upheld a license
tax on lawyers, saying that, while such a tax "must be levied on
27155 Ky. 30, 159 S. W. 673 (1913).
28 Ky. L. Rep. 870, 3 S. W. 802 (1887). See also the following:
Elliott v. City of Louisville, 101 Ky. 262, 40 S. W. 690 (1897); Levi v.
City of Louisville, 97 Ky. 394, 30 S. W. 973 (1895); Burch v. City of
Owensboro, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 284, 36 S. W. 12 (1896).
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all alike in the same profession, it is not essential to its validity
that every calling within the particular locality shall be required
to pay the tax". In the same way the occupation of peddlers
may be taxed although the taxes on this occupation are usually
upheld under the police power rather than as being merely for
revenue purposes.
29
A second principle which the court has followed is to per-
mit the legislature to tax business according to the amount of
business done without the rate of the tax changing as the volume
of business changed. Thus, a license tax of one and one-fourth
cents per gallon on distilled spirits manufactured by companies
in Kentucky which was challenged as a property tax and not
uniform was upheld as a valid license tax.30 The court in dis-
cussing the principle on which the law was based merely cited
the case of Strater Bros. Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, dis-
cussed later, where a license tax based on the value of the goods
produced was upheld. The same principle was applied in Greene
v. Taylor, Jr., and Sons 31 where the statute was upheld imposing
a license tax of two cents a gallon on distilled spirits manufac-
tured in Kentucky or stored in bonded warehouses in the state.
A contrary decision, however, was reached by a divided court
in Craig et al. v. E. H. Taylor, Jr., and Sons32 where a tax, pur-
porting to be a license tax of fifty cents a gallon on "every cor-
poration, etc. . . . engaged in the business of manufacturing
distilled spirits ... ; and every corporation, etc .... engaged in
the business of owning and storing such spirits in bonded ware-
houses in this state, and in removing same therefrom" '3 3 was held
to be a property and not a license tax. The company had tem-
porarily ceased manufacturing liquor and the court by a strange
City of Newport v. French Bros. Bauer Co., 169 Ky. 174, 183 S. W.
562 (1916); West v. City of Aft. Sterling, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1670, 65 S. W.
120 (1901); City of Carlisle v. Hechinger, 103 Ky. 381, 45 S. W. 358
(1898).
"Brown-Forman Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 402, 101 S. W.
321 (1907). The pending litigation involving the tax of seven cents a
quart on the sale of ice cream in this state involves the same prin-
ciple. This law has been declared unconstitutional by Circuit Judge
W. B. Ardery in Aniello v. State Tax Commission as "discriminatory,
if not substantially confiscatory", although the exact provision of the
constitution on which the opinion is based is not given. The case is
at time of writing before the Court of Appeals.
a184 Ky. 739, 212 S. W. 295 (1919).
'2192 Ky. 36, 232 S. W. 39 (1921).
'Id. at 398.
K. L. J.-5
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process of reasoning held that the tax was not on the business
of storing, nor on the business of storing and removing liquor,
nor yet alone on removing liquor. It was in fact a tax on prop-
erty. A strong dissenting opinion was written by Judge Samp-
son in which he contended that it was a license tax and valid.
As was pointed out above license taxes are sometimes called
franchise taxes. In Southern Building and Loan Association v.
Norma 3 4 the court had before it such a tax. A statute imposed
a license tax of two dollars on every one hundred dollars of
gross receipts of foreign building and loan associations doing
business in the state. The court held that this was a franchise
tax on the privilege of doing business in the state as distin-
guished fromi a corporate franchise tax. So long as the tax ap-
plied to all such companies it was uniform, and Kentucky could
determine the terms on which foreign companies could do busi-
ness here.
A statute, however, imposing a license tax on foreign insur-
ance companies doing business in the state and graduated accord-
ing to the business done, that is, two dollars on each one hundred
dollars of premiums, but which contained a provision calling for
whatever additional tax was necessary to equal the tax imposed
by the state concerned on Kentucky companies, was held invalid.
Such a law was lacking in the uniformity and equality intended
by the Kentucky constitution, said the court.35 In other words
foreign companies could do business in Kentucky on a basis of
equality with domestic companies, subject apparently to the
qualification laid down in the case of Southern Building & Loan
Association v. Norman, above.
In State Tax Commission v. Hughes Drug Co.36 the court
had before it an excise tax in the restricted sense of the term.
A state statute imposed a tax of fifty cents per pint on the sale
of distilled spirits by any concern. It was challenged on the
ground that it was a revenue measure and not uniform since it
applied to druggists only and only to part of the druggists'
business. It was argued, on the authority of Commonwealth v.
Fowler,37 that as a revenue measure it was invalid. In that case
"98 Ky. 294, 32 S. W. 952 (1895).
"Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth,
133 Ky. 292, 117- S. W. 376 (1909).
"219 Ky. 432, 293 S. W. 944 (1927).
=96 Ky. 166, 28 S. W 786 (1894).
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a similar law applicable to druggists only was upheld on the
ground of the police power, the court saying that it would not
be sustained as a revenue measure. In the case now before the
court, however, the court said the law by its terms applied to
everybody who might be authorized to sell liquor even though
in fact only druggists were so authorized. In Commonwealth v.
Fowler, the court pointed out the law applied only to druggists
though others were permitted to sell liquor. It went on to say
that what was said in that case to the effect that the law would
not be upheld as a revenue measure was dictum. The statute in
the present case, the court went on, did not have to apply to the
whole of a druggist's business since it was an excise. To hold
that it did was "to confuse such a tax -with an occupation tax".38
The law was therefore not lacking in uniformity.
A third principle applied by the court in passing upon the
validity of excise taxes is to permit the legislature to divide a
general class into separate classes according to the volume of
business done, with the tax rate increasing with the volume of
business. Sometimes the law makes only two classes, while in
other laws several classes are made. In Strater Bros. Tobacco
Co. v. Comnzrwealth39 a statute imposed on tobacco factories
in the state a license tax of one dollar on the marketable value
of each one thousand dollars of product up to one hundred
thousand dollars and at the rate of fifty cents on each one thou-
sand dollars of the marketable value on all in excess of the first
one hundred thousand dollars. It was challenged as being a
property tax and not uniform and hence unconstitutional. The
court, however, held that it was a license tax and not "lacking
in the quality of uniformity". "It is the same", the court con-
tinued, "on each person or corporation which manufactures the
same quantity of tobacco. The legislature had the right to im-
pose a graduated license taX.'40
The same principle was applied in Gordon v. City of Louis-
ville4 ' where a city ordinance was in question by which a license
3Id. 946. In Shanks v. Ky. Independent Oil Co., 225 Ky. 303,
8 S. W. (2d) 383 (1928), the court also had before it a pure excise
law and drew a distinction between it and a license tax. See also,
Raydure v. Board of Supervisors of Estill County, where a production
tax on oil was upheld as a license tax. 183 Ky. 84, 209 S. W. 19 (1919).
117 Ky. 604, 78 S. W. 871 (1904).
' I d. at 608.
-1138 Ky. 442, 128 S. W. 327 (1910).
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tax was imposed on merchandise brokers. Those whose business
amounted to two hundred thousand dollars or less annually had
to pay a tax of twenty-five dollars; those whose business
amounted to from two hundred thousand dollars to three hun-
dred thousand dollars had to pay a tax of thirty-five dollars.
Those whose business amounted to more than three hundred thou-
sand dollars had to pay a tax of fifty dollars. The ordinance was
challenged as being based upon an unreasonable classification,
and as not being uniform as to the classes. The court stated the
three principles, explained above, which it had applied and after
emphasizing that exact equality in a tax system could not be
achieved, declared that a classification had to have a reasonable
basis "or, to put it another way, there must be some reason for
the classification, as well as for the division of those engaged in a
particular line of business into more than one class. This must be
left in the first instance to the discretion and good judgment of
the legislative bodies . . .to be finally tested by the judicial tri-
bunals". The classification here was "manifestly suggested by
the fact that the broker who did a small business should not be
taxed as much as the one who did a big business." 42 This was
neither unreasonable nor unjust, the court thought, and the law
therefore was not lacking in uniformity.
This principle was applied also by the court in upholding
the gross sales tax.4 3 Here the tax was graduated according to
the gross sales with the rate increasing as the sales increased.
The court held that not only could the legislature classify for
tax purposes, but it could "discriminate in favor of certain
classes if the discrimination be founded upon a reasonable dis-
tinction". 44 Classification according to the volume of business
done is based on a valid distinction.
The city of Louisville sought to substitute for an ad valorem
tax a license tax on merchants and manufacturers graduated in
such a way that the rate decreased as the volume of business
increased. The court declared the law lacking in uniformity.
The small manufacturer had a greater burden than the large
and this produced practical inequality. "The rich and the poor
-"Id., at 448.
"Moore v. State Board of Charities and Corrections, 239 Ky. 729, 40
S. W. (2d) 349 (1931).
"Id. at 738.
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must be taxed alike", 45 said the court. If the law had been
laid in such a way as to make the burden practically the same
as under an ad valorem tax it would have been valid,46 the court
indicated. Again in City of Newport v. Frankel, et al.4 7 the
court declared a tax invalid because it was based on an unreason-
able classification. Newport imposed an annual tax of three hun-
dred dollars on theaters whose admission fee was not more than
ten cents; if admission was more than ten cents and not more
than fifteen cents, the tax was four hundred and fifty dollars; if
the admission was more than fifteen cents the annual tax was four
hundred and fifty dollars plus fifteen dollars a day for each day
on which said admission was charged. The court pointed out
that while the increase in the admission charged by a show
charging twenty cents over one charging fifteen cents was only
one-third of the lower admission fee, the increase in tax was one
thousand per cent. "Manifestly", said the court, "there is no
sound basis for this distinction.' '48 The law was therefore dis-
criminatory and invalid.
The tax laws considered in the foregoing cases were pri-
marily revenue measures and were treated as such by the court.
But excise taxes are often enacted under the police power for
regulatory purposes. Does the uniformity clause limit the legis-
lature in such cases?
In the case of Hager v. Walker,49 considered above, the
court emphasized that what it said about the law not being uni-
form had no application to a measure enacted under the police
power. Also, in Commonwealth v. Fowler5 ° above, the court in
upholding as a police measure a license tax on druggists who
sold liquor stated that the law would not be upheld as a revenue
law. In Standard Oil Co. v. Commonwealtk5 the court had
upheld under the police power a tax on each oil depot of the
company which it said would not be upheld as a property tax.
This would seem to indicate that there was some difference in
imposing excise taxes for revenue and for regulatory purposes.
4 George Schuster and Co. v. City of Louisville, 124 Ky. 189 at
206, 89 S. W. 689 (1907).
", Id. at 207.
' 192 Ky. 408, 233 S. W. 884 (1921).
IId. at 410.
S Supra, note 5.
6 Supra, note 37.
119 Ky. 75, 82 S. W. 1020 (1904).
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But in Commonwealth v. Pazyne Medical Co., 52 discussed
above, the court, in holding invalid as lacking in uniformity a
statute requiring a license tax of one hundred dollars of all
vendors of patent medicines exclusively, said, "the doctrine of
uniformity . . . applies with as much force to police measures
as it does to revenue measures". It is difficult to harmonize these
statements but since the statements indicating a difference be-
tween police and revenue laws were dicta and the latter decision
a holding the law would seem to be that the uniformity clause
does apply to both types of measures. However, the court will
apparently go a little farther in upholding a police measure than
one merely for revenue.
The results of this investigation may be summarized as
follows:
By court decisions the uniformity clause of the Kentucky
constitution applies to excise taxes as well as to property taxes.
In passing upon the uniformity of an excise tax the Court of
Appeals has laid down three principles upon which it will uphold
such taxes. First, the same tax on all in a particular class with-
out regard to the amount of business done is valid. The chief
difficulty in applying this principle arises from the efforts of the
legislature and city councils to determine the classes. The
grouping of the taxpayers into classes must not, in the opinion
of the court be arbitrary. That is to say there must be a basis
for the classification which under all the circumstances strikes
the court as reasonable and just. Second, a specific tax per
unit of business done may be imposed on a class so that the total
amount of tax paid will depend on the volume of business done.
Third, a general class may be divided by law into sub-classes
and each sub-class be taxed according to the volume of business
done with the rate increasing with the volume of business. In
the application of the last two principles, as in the first, the
court must be convinced of the reasonableness and justness of
the classification. Further, the uniformity clause applies to
taxes imposed under the police power as well as to those imposed
only for revenue purposes.
2138 Ky. 164, 168, 127 S. W. 760 (1910).
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